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The existing theory of decoy-state quantum cryptography assumes the counting rates of the same
state from different sources to be the same, given whatever channel. This is correct if the intensity
of each individual pulse is controlled exactly. We show by an explicit example that the assumption
is in general incorrect if the source is inexactly controlled and the error pattern is known to Eve.
We then further develop the theory of decoy-state method so that it is unconditionally secure given
whatever error pattern provided that the error is not too large and the bounds of errors are known.
Our result is not only limitted to the coherent states. It allpies to all source states satisfying Eq.(17).
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
Introduction.— Most of the existing set-ups of quan-
tum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2, 3, 4, 5] use imperfect
single-photon source. Such an implementation in princi-
ple suffers from the photon-number-splitting attack [6, 7].
The decoy-state method [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] and some other
methods [13, 14, 15] can be used for unconditionally se-
cure QKD even Alice only uses an imperfect source[6, 7].
The separate theoretical results of ILM-GLLP [5]
shows that a secure final key can be distilled even though
an imperfect source is used in the protocol, if one knows
the lower bound of the fraction of those raw bits gener-
ated by single-photon pulses from Alice. The decoy-state
method is to verify such a bound faithfully and efficiently.
Recently, a number of experiments on decoy-state QKD
have been done [16, 17]. However, the existing decoy-
state theory assumes the perfect control of light intensity.
This is an impossible task for any real set-up in practice.
Here we study the decoy-state method with intensity er-
rors and we conclude that after revising, the decoy-state
method is still secure and efficient. Our result immedi-
ately applies to all existing experimental results.
Existing theory .— Given a class of Nx pulses, after Alice
sends them out to Bob, if Bob observes nx counts at his
side, the counting rate for pulses in this class is
sx = nx/Nx. (1)
Proposition 1: If class X is divided into l subclasses
and any pulse in X belongs to only one subclass and
the fraction of pulses in each subclasses are a0, a1 · · · , al,
then the counting rate of class X is SX =
∑l
k=0 aksk
and sk is the counting rate of the kth subclass.
Proposition 2. The counting rate of pulses from
class y must be equal to that of class y′ if: 1) each class
contains sufficiently large number of pulses; 2) pulses of
each class are independent and identical; 3) the density
operator of a pulse from class y is equal to that of class
y′, 4) pulses of y and y′ are randomly mixed.
Alice has 3 different sources Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ which can pro-
duce states of ρ0 = |0〉〈0|, ρµ, ρµ′ only. Suppose
ρµ =
∑
k=0
ak|k〉〈k|; ρµ′ =
∑
k=0
a′k|k〉〈k| (2)
and we request the following constraints for all n > 2:
a′k
ak
>
a′2
a2
. (3)
Here the states are subscribed by µ and µ′ because the
diagonal states are actually determined by the intensity
µ or µ′. For example, a coherent state of intensity q with
phase randomization is
ρµ =
∞∑
k=0
µke−µ
k!
|k〉〈k|. (4)
If Alice uses coherent states of intensity 0, µ, and µ′ for
source Y0, Yµ and Yµ′ in the protocol, the state parame-
ters are ak =
µke−µ
k! , a
′
k =
µ′
k
e−µ
′
k! .
We regard the pulses from each source as a class,
i.e.class Y0 for intensity 0, class Yµ for intensity µ
′ and
class Yµ′ for intensity µ
′. We shall also call the pulses in
class Yµ, Yµ′ the decoy pulses and the signal pulses, re-
spectively for simplicity. We regard those decoy or signal
pulses containing k photons as (sub-)class yk or y
′
k. We
also use the term sub-source for sub-class.
Proposition 1 leads to the following relation,
Sµ =
∞∑
k=0
aksk = a0s0 + a1s1 + λ (5)
and λ =
∑
∞
k=2 aksk, Sµ is the total counting rate of all
decoy pulses, sk is the counting rate of pulses in class yk.
Also, we have
Sµ′ =
∞∑
k=0
a′ks
′
k (6)
2and Sµ′ , s
′
k are the counting rates of all signal pulses and
class y′k, respectively[10]. In the protocol, Alice chooses
each source randomly in producing each pulse for Bob. If
each source always produces the assumed state exactly,
pulses from sub-sources y0, y
′
0, Y0 are randomly mixed,
and so are classes yk, y
′
k. According to Proposition 2,
s0 = s
′
0 = S0, sk = s
′
k (7)
where S0 is the counting rate of class Y0. Also, using the
assumed condition in Eq.(3), we can simplify Eq.(6) as
Sµ′ =
∞∑
k=0
a′ksk ≥ a
′
0s0 + a
′
1s1 +
a′2
a2
λ. (8)
According to the definition of counting rate, S0, Sµ, Sµ′
can be observed directly in the protocol. Since there are
only two unknown variables (s1, λ) for two constraints
in Eq.(5) and Eq.(8), the lower bound value of s1 can be
verified by solving these joint constraints.
s1 ≥
a′2(Sµ − a0s0)− a2(Sµ′ − a
′
0s0)
a′2a1 − a
′
1a2
. (9)
Given this, one can calculate the final key rate by[5, 11]
R = ∆′1[1−H(t1)]−H(t) (10)
where ∆′1 =
a1s1
Sµ′
is the fraction of single-photon counts
among the raw bits due to signal pulses and t1, t are the
QBER for single-photon pulses and the QBER for all
signal pulses. This is the result the decoy-state method
with whatever diagonal source-state, including the co-
herent state, thermal state, heralded single-photon state,
and so on with the condition of Eq.(3) and exactly con-
trolled source.
The consequence of correlated intensity error.—The ex-
isting theory assumes that the parameters for state of
each individual decoy pulses and signal pulses keep to be
constant. In practice, these parameters cannot be con-
stant for all pulses[19, 20]. If the parameter errors are
independent, then we can [19] use the averaged state for
each source to verify the lower bound of s1 by Eq.(9).
However, the issue becomes more complicated in the
most general situation when there are correlated inten-
sity errors. As shown explicitly below, in such a case, the
average-state method fails and we have to consider the
instantaneous intensity of each individual pulses.
There can be correlated intensity errors which are not
known to Alice and Bob but is known to Eve. (This
situation is more realistic if one uses the decoy-state plug-
and-play protocol[21], where Eve. can actually prepare
the error pattern). Consider a specific example. In the
whole protocol, the pulses are divided into M blocks.
Each block contains N/M pulses and N = N0 + Nµ +
Nµ′ , where N0, Nµ, Nµ′ are number of pulses from source
Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ , N is the total number of pulses. The state
of each individual pulse from source Y0, Yµ′ are always
controlled exactly. But there are errors for the state of
pulses from source Yµ (decoy pulse). Say, in half of those
M blocks, state for every decoy pulse is actually vacuum
(we name any of such blocks as block D0). In the other
half of blocks, the intensity of each decoy pulse is twice
of the assumed value, i.e., 2µ, and µ is the value for
the assumed intensity that Alice wants to use for each
decoy pulse. We name these blocks as block D2. Note
that either block D0 or block D2 consists of three classes,
Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ . Eve. knows such type of error pattern but
Alice does not know it. We shall assume µ = 0.2 and µ′ =
0.6 in the protocol. Actually, by watching the averaged
photon number of each block, Eve can know exactly the
intensity of decoy pulses in each block, i.e., 0 or 2µ = 0.4,
provided that N/M is not so small.
Here is Eve’s scheme using time-dependent chan-
nel: she blocks all pulses from block D0, and she pro-
duces a linear channel of transmittance ηe to attenuate
each pulse from block D2. Straightly, the actual counting
rate for the sub-source y1 is s1 =
2ηeµe
−2µ
2µe−2µ = ηe and the
actual counting rate for sub-source y′1 is
s′1 =
1
2
ηeµ
′e−µ
′
µ′e−µ′
= ηe/2. (11)
Obviously, s1 6= s
′
1. Similarly, we can also show that
sk 6= s
′
k. This shows, given the correlated error which is
known to Eve, Eve can treat the pulses from sub-sources
yk and y
′
k differently ! Proposition 2 of the existing decoy-
state theory can not be used anymore. Given the corre-
lated intensity error, pulses from sub-source yk and y
′
k
are actually not randomly mixed: in some blocks, the
number of k−photon decoy pulses are larger than that of
other blocks.
If one disregards the fact that Proposition 2 does not
hold now and go ahead to use Eq.(9) with the averaged
state for the decoy pulse, the protocol will be insecure be-
cause the calculated value of the single-photon counting
rate by the existing theory will be larger than the true
value. For simplicity, we assume S0 = 0. Given the Eve’s
scheme above, Alice and Bob will find
Sµ =
1− e−2ηeµ
2
≈ 0.2ηe; Sµ′ =
1− e−ηeµ
′
2
≈ 0.3ηe
(12)
If we go ahead to assume sk = s
′
k and blindly use Eq.(9),
the counting rate of sub-source y′1 can be obtained by
replacing ai with the 0.4
ke−0.4/k!/2 there. The result
for the counting rate of single-photon pulses by Eq.(9) is
s1 = s
′
1 ≥ 2.65336ηe (13)
which is larger than the real value ηe/2 as shown Eq.(11).
This means, the value of counting rate for single-photon
from signal pulses verified by the protocol would be larger
than the true value and hence the protocol is insecure.
3A more realistic case[8] that in certain blocks, inten-
sities of all pulses are a bit higher and in other blocks
intensities of all pulses are a bit lower than the assumed
values, it is also found that s1 6= s
′
1 therefore existing
decoy state theory cannot be used blindly.
Remark on proposition 2.— The above study has clearly
shown that, if there are correlated intensity errors of light
intensity, Proposition 2 cannot be blindly used because
here y1 and y
′
1 are not randomly mixed and the result is
insecure given the time-dependent Eve’s channel.
Our solution.— In the actual protocol, each pulse sent
from Alice is randomly chosen from one of 3 sources
{Y0, Yµ, Yµ′} with probability p0, pµ, pµ′ (p0 + pµ + pµ′ =
1). For simplicity, we assume that every pulse in class Y0
is exactly in vacuum state. But each single shot of pulse
in classes Yµ, Yµ′ can be in a state slightly different from
the expected one. We assume at time i Alice actually
produces
ρµi =
∑
aki|k〉〈k| (14)
or
ρµ′i =
∑
a′ki|k〉〈k| (15)
instead of ρµ or ρµ′ as defined in Eq.(2), where the pa-
rameters of each |k〉〈k| are constant. If Alice uses co-
herent states, the time-dependent parameters aki, a
′
ki are
determined by the time-dependent intensities by aki =
µki e
−µ
k! , a
′
ki =
µ′ki e
−µ′
i
k! , and µi( or µ
′
i) is the instantaneous
intensity of the i’th pulse ( decoy signal pulse). Lets first
consider a virtual protocol, Protocol 1: At each time
i in sending a pulse to Bob, Alice produces a two-pulse
(pulse A and pulse B) bipartite state
ρ2i = p0|z0〉〈z0|⊗|0〉〈0|+pµ|z1〉〈z1|⊗ρµi+pµ′ |z2〉〈z2|⊗ρµ′i
(16)
Here the first subspace is for pulse A and the second
subspace is for pulse B; i runs from 1 to N , the to-
tal number of pulses transmitted to Bob. States {|zx〉}
are orthogonal to each other for different x (x = 0, 1, 2).
Alice keeps pulse A and sends out pulse B to Bob. Af-
ter Bob completes the detection, Alice measures pulse
A. The outcome of |z0〉, |z1〉 or |z2〉 of pulse A cor-
responds to class Y0, Yµ or Yµ′ for pulse B. Asymp-
totically, the number of pulses in theses classes should
be N0 = p0N, Nµ = pµN, Nµ′ = pµ′N . We use
notation aLk , a
U
k for lower bound and upper bound of
{aki|i = 0, 1 · · ·N}, a
′L
k , a
′U
k for lower bound and upper
bound of {a′ki|i = 0, 1, · · ·N}. Also, we need
a′Lk
aUk
≥
a′L2
aU2
> 1 (17)
for all k > 2. In the protocol, Alice could have known
the exact photon number in any pulse before sending it
to Bob. We define those pulses containing k photons as
class y˜k, e.g., all the single-photon pulses make of class
y˜1. For clarity, we also define set {lk} (k = 0, 1, 2 · · ·): for
the ith pulse (i from 1 to N), if the pulse contains k pho-
tons, then i ∈ lk. Since Alice could have known the pho-
ton number in each pulse, any i must belong to only one
lk. Asymptotically, there should be Nk =
∑N
1 (pµaki +
pµ′a
′
ki) pulses (elements) in class (set) y˜k (lk) for any
k > 0 and there areN0 =
∑N
i=1(p0+a0ipµ+a
′
0ipµ′) pulses
(elements ) in class (set) y˜0 (l0). Also, each individual
pulse can only belong to one class from {y˜k|k = 0, 1, · · ·}.
Most generally, we assume the instantaneous transmit-
tance of the i’th pulse to be ηi (i from 1 to N), which
should be either 0 or 1. If the pulse causes no count
at Bob’s side, the instantaneous counting rate for that
pulse is 0, otherwise it is 1. Given any photon number
state |k〉〈k|, it can be from both class Yµ and class Yµ′ .
Asymptotically, the numbers of counts caused by decoy
pulses (pulses from class Yµ), signal pulses and pulses in
class Y0 are
nµ =
∑
i∈l0
pµa0idi +
∞∑
k=1
∑
i∈lk
pµakidi, (18)
nµ′ =
∑
i∈l0
pµ′a
′
0idi +
∞∑
k=1
∑
i∈lk
pµ′a
′
kidi (19)
and
n(Y0) =
∑
i∈l0
p0
p0 + pµa0i + pµ′a′0i
ηi, (20)
respectively, where di is defined as
di =
ηi
pµa0i + pµ′a′0i + p0
; if i ∈ l0 (21)
di =
ηi
pµaki + pµ′a′ki
; if i ∈ lk, k ≥ 1 (22)
The values of nµ, nµ′ and n(Y0) can be directly observed
in the protocol, therefore are regarded as known parame-
ters. Based on Eq.(20), we have the following inequality:
∑
i∈l0
pµa0idi ≤
pµa
U
0 n(Y0)
p0
= pµa
U
0 S0N, (23)
pµ′a
′
0idi ≥
pµ′a
′L
0 n(Y0)
p0
= pµ′a
′L
0 S0N (24)
and S0 =
n(Y0)
p0N
, the counting rate of class Y0, which is
observed in the protocol itself. Given bounded values for
parameters {aki, a
′
ki}, we have
nµ ≤ pµa
U
0 S0N + pµa
U
1
∑
i∈l1
di + pµ
∞∑
k=2
aUk (
∑
i∈lk
di) (25)
4TABLE I: Secure key rate (R) vs different values of intensity
error upper bound (δM ) using the experimental data in the
case of 50 km [17]. The experiment lasts for 1481.2 seconds
with the repetition rate 4 MHz. We have observed Sµ′ =
3.817 × 10−4, Sµ = 1.548 × 10
−4, S0 = 2.609 × 10
−5 and the
quantum bit error rates (QBER) for signal states and decoy
states are 4.247%, 8.379% respectively.
δM 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0
R (Hz) 70.8 84.3 97.6 110.7 123.6 136.3
and
nµ′ ≥ pµ′a
′L
0 S0N + pµ′a
′L
1
∑
i∈l1
di + pµ′
∞∑
k=2
a′Lk (
∑
i∈lk
di).
(26)
Using the assumed conditions given in Eq.(17) we can
solve the above simultaneous constraints and obtain
1
N
∑
i∈l1
di ≥
a′L2 Sµ − a
U
2 Sµ′ + a
′L
0 a
U
2 S0 − a
U
0 a
′L
2 S0
a′L2 a
U
1 − a
′L
1 a
U
2
(27)
where Sµ =
nµ
pµN
=
nµ
Nµ
, Sµ′ =
nµ′
Nµ′
. The fraction of
single-photon counts among those counts caused by sig-
nal pulses is
P
i∈l1
a′
1idi
pµ′NSµ′
, which is lower bounded by
∆′1 ≥
a′L1 (a
′L
2 Sµ − a
U
2 Sµ′ + a
′L
0 a
U
2 S0 − a
U
0 a
′L
2 S0)
Sµ′(a′L2 a
U
1 − a
′L
1 a
U
2 )
(28)
and the fraction of single-photon counts of decoy pulses
is lower bounded by
∆1 ≥
aL1 (a
′L
2 Sµ − a
U
2 Sµ′ + a
′L
0 a
U
2 S0 − a
U
0 a
′L
2 S0)
Sµ(a′L2 a
U
1 − a
′L
1 a
U
2 )
(29)
For coherent states, if the intensity is bounded by
[µL, µU ] for decoy pulses and [µ′L, µ′U ] for signal pulses
then
aXk = (µ
X)ke−µ
X
/k!, a′Xk = (µ
′X)ke−µ
′X
/k! (30)
with X = L,U and k = 1, 2. Therefore, one can calculate
the final key rate by Eq.(10) now, if the bound values of
intensity errors are known. The asymptotic result using
the experimental data of QKD distance of 50 kilometers
calculated by our formula is listed in table I.
The results above are for the virtual protocol where
Alice uses the bipartite state of Eq.(16). Obviously Alice
can choose to measure all A-pulses of each bipartite state
in the very beginning and the virtual protocol is reduced
to the normal protocol in practice, where the bipartite
state is not necessary.
Application in the Plug-and-Play protocol.— As shown by
Gisin et al[21], combining with the decoy-state method,
the plug-and-play protocol can be unconditionally secure.
There, Alice receives strong pulses from Bob and she
needs to guarantee the exact intensity of the pulse send-
ing to Bob. It is not difficult to monitor the intensity,
but difficult to control the intensity. Our theory here can
help to save the difficult feed-back intensity control: Al-
ice monitors the intensities, discards those pulses whose
intensity error is too large, and then use our theory with
the known bound bound of intensity errors.
Concluding remark: In summary, we have shown the
the unconditional security of decoy-state method given
what-ever error patern of the source, provided that the
parameters diagonal state of the source satisfy Eq.(17)
and the bound values of each parameters in the state is
known. Our result here applies to whatever distribution
of source state that satisfies Eq.(17). Our result also an-
swers clearly the often asked question “What happens if
the state of Laser beam is not exactly in the assumed
distribution ?”. Here we don’t need exact information
about the source state, we only need the bound values
for parameters a1, a2.1
′
1, a
′
2 and Eq.(17).
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